By: Rabbi Shay Tahan
As the debate over making Daylight Saving Time permanent continues, much of the discussion in the Jewish world has focused on the burden it would place on religious communities, particularly during the winter months when sunrise would occur later. Agudath Israel of America has expressed concern that a later sunrise would significantly delay the time for Shacharit, forcing many working individuals to choose between praying with a minyan and arriving at work on time.
Supporters of permanent Daylight Saving Time, however, point to a different set of concerns. They argue that the biannual clock changes themselves come with a measurable human cost. Studies have associated the transition to and from Daylight Saving Time with an increase in traffic accidents, workplace injuries, sleep deprivation, and even certain cardiovascular events. According to this view, eliminating the twice-yearly time change would improve public safety, reduce fatigue-related accidents, and spare millions of people the disruption caused by abruptly shifting their internal clocks.
How should these competing considerations be weighed? On the one hand, preserving the ability of the public to attend Shacharit with a minyan is a significant Torah value. On the other hand, if changing the clocks contributes to preventable injuries and loss of life, the Torah places the highest priority on protecting human life and preventing danger. How would halachah balance these values? In the following discussion, we will examine the principal arguments in favor of ending the seasonal clock changes and consider how the Torah’s concern for both spiritual obligations and physical safety may guide our understanding of this contemporary issue.
In addressing matters of danger and personal safety, Chazal present two seemingly conflicting approaches. On the one hand, they repeatedly emphasize that a person must do everything reasonably possible to avoid danger, even when the risk appears remote. The Torah commands us to safeguard our lives, and Chazal teach that חמירא סכנתא מאיסורא—we treat matters involving danger even more stringently than matters involving ritual prohibition. This fundamental principle is known as pikuach nefesh. The preservation of human life overrides virtually all of the Torah’s commandments not only when a person’s life is in immediate danger, but even in cases of doubtful danger (safek pikuach nefesh) and, in many instances, where the danger is more remote, provided there is a reasonable concern that life may be at risk.
On the other hand, Chazal also invoke the pasuk “שׁוֹמֵר פְּתָאִים ה‘” (Tehilim 116:6), teaching that Hashem protects those who engage in ordinary activities that carry only minimal and commonly accepted risks. This principle recognizes that life cannot be lived without some degree of risk, and that not every remote possibility of harm requires a person to refrain from normal human conduct.
The challenge, therefore, lies in determining where to draw the line. At what point does a risk become significant enough that halachah obligates us to avoid it, and when may one rely on the principle of שומר פתאים ה‘? This question is central to many contemporary issues involving public health and safety, including the debate over Daylight Saving Time.
The apparent contradiction is addressed by the Mesillat Yesharim (Chapter 9). He explains that while a person is obligated to avoid dangers that are apparent and reasonably foreseeable, the Torah does not require one to refrain from ordinary activities merely because they involve some remote possibility of harm. Since it is impossible to live in this world without encountering a certain degree of risk, one must take appropriate precautions where necessary, but may otherwise conduct himself in the normal manner of society while placing his trust in Hashem. Thus, the principle of שומר פתאים ה applies to ordinary, commonly accepted risks, whereas one may not rely on it to ignore a genuine or significant danger.
The Poskim further developed this principle, each offering a slightly different framework for determining when one must avoid danger and when one may rely on the principle of שומר פתאים ה‘.
1. Immediate versus potential danger: The Binyan Tzion (134) and Mishneh Halachot (5:144) distinguish between an immediate, present danger—which one is obligated to avoid—and a potential or future danger, where one may, under appropriate circumstances, rely on שומר פתאים ה. Nevertheless, if the potential danger is common or likely to occur, one may no longer rely on this principle and must take appropriate precautions. Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman explains that the Torah does not require a person to withdraw from ordinary life because of every remote possibility of danger. When the risk is neither immediate nor tangible and is part of normal human activity, one may follow the majority.
2. The public’s perception of danger: Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo 2:37:59) suggests that society’s perception of risk plays an important role. If most people regard a particular activity as dangerous and avoid it, Halachah likewise considers it a genuine danger that requires precaution. Conversely, if an activity is widely accepted as safe and people do not ordinarily avoid it, it is generally not classified as a halachic danger. He illustrates this principle with the case of routine smallpox vaccination. Although vaccination carries a slight risk, one may not violate Shabbat in order to receive it, since the danger is not regarded as immediate or life-threatening. Because the public generally perceives the risk as minimal and accepts it as part of normal medical practice, it is not classified as a halachic danger that warrants overriding Shabbat.
3. Remote or speculative danger: Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, Orach Chaim 2:111) rules that one may engage in normal activities when the danger is only slight, unlikely, or merely a possibility.
In summary, based on the approaches discussed above, one could argue that the increased risk of accidents attributed to fatigue following the seasonal clock changes does not constitute an immediate or likely danger. Rather, it represents a potential and relatively remote risk affecting only a small percentage of those exposed. Hence such a risk generally falls within the category in which one may rely on the principle of שומר פתאים ה‘, and it does not necessarily obligate society to alter its normal course of conduct.
Accordingly, there is room to argue that preserving a winter schedule that allows the public to attend Shacharit at a reasonable hour should take precedence over changing the clocks solely to reduce a speculative increase in fatigue-related accidents.
Of course, this conclusion depends upon the assumption that the increased accident rate remains relatively small and does not rise to the level of a significant or commonly occurring danger. Should future evidence demonstrate that the clock changes create a substantial and well-established threat to human life, the halachic analysis would require renewed consideration in light of the Torah’s paramount concern for the preservation of life.