While the horrors of the October 7 massacre were largely associated with the thousands of Hamas terrorists who stormed Israeli communities by land, a senior Israeli officer who investigated the attack says an equally dangerous battle was unfolding off Israel’s coastline. Brig. Gen. (res.) Oren Solomon now says Hamas came dangerously close to carrying out a devastating maritime strike that, had it succeeded, could have triggered an unimaginable catastrophe. “Half of Ashkelon could have been vaporized,” he warned.

The world watched as terrorists breached the Gaza border fence and overran communities throughout southern Israel. But Solomon, who led the investigative team examining the Gaza Division’s performance during the war, says the naval front has received only limited attention despite the extraordinary danger it posed.

Speaking with Arutz Sheva, Solomon disclosed details from the Israeli Navy’s internal investigation, arguing that much of what occurred at sea has never been fully presented to the public. He said that while Hamas launched its assault on land with thousands of terrorists, drones, UAVs, and paragliders, it simultaneously activated a sophisticated naval force equipped with elite commandos, high-speed attack boats, and unmanned submarines carrying massive explosive payloads.

According to Solomon, Hamas spent years building what he described as one of its most advanced military capabilities. “These weren’t just naval commandos,” he said. “These were forces trained in diving, amphibious landings, and carrying out attacks by sea. In addition, Hamas developed unmanned submarines with remote navigation capabilities, carrying substantial explosive charges.”

He said that as the attack began at approximately 6:30 a.m., seven commando boats carrying roughly 45 terrorists departed the Gaza coast, each assigned to a separate objective. Two vessels were reportedly dispatched to attack an Israeli offshore natural gas platform, while others targeted strategic sites, including EAPC facilities. Another boat reached Zikim Beach, where terrorists murdered civilians who had sought refuge inside a bomb shelter and a public restroom.

Solomon believes the greatest disaster was narrowly prevented. “If the boats assigned to the gas platform had succeeded,” Solomon said, “we would have faced an event on an entirely different scale. A successful strike on an active gas platform could have caused an enormous disaster.”

He added that the danger did not end with the initial morning attack. Later that afternoon, Hamas launched an unmanned underwater explosive craft toward Israel, but the Israeli Navy intercepted it before it could reach its target.

“This is an incident that has barely been discussed,” he said. “Had that submersable struck the gas platform, half of Ashkelon could have been vaporized. It was a great miracle.”

Beyond recounting the events of that day, Solomon sharply criticized the official investigations that followed the war. In his view, they fail to accurately reflect what happened, placing the blame primarily on commanders in the field while shielding more senior military leaders from responsibility.

As one example, Solomon highlighted the actions of Ashdod Naval Base commander Col. Eitan Paz. He said that at approximately 4:30 a.m., Paz was informed by the Gaza Division commander that unusual developments had been detected overnight. At the same time, commanders were instructed not to alter normal military activity out of concern that visible preparations might alert Hamas.

Rather than relying exclusively on those orders, Solomon said Paz contacted Navy Headquarters to confirm the intelligence before independently raising the alert level. He mobilized reserve personnel, sent naval vessels to sea, reinforced security around strategic installations, and personally returned to command the base.

“These were tactical actions intended to balance the directive not to disrupt routine with the need to be prepared,” Solomon said. “The forces had also conducted an exercise just one month earlier that simulated an infiltration by commando boats, so when the attack began, they knew exactly how to respond.”

Despite those decisions, Solomon said Paz ultimately became the one held accountable.

“The commander of Ashdod Naval Base left his position, while the entire chain of command above him remained in place. That’s a question that needs to be asked.”

Solomon also contended that the Israeli Navy had gathered unusual intelligence in the days before October 7 that was never passed along to the Ashdod base commander. Additional warning signs received during the night, he claimed, likewise failed to result in the operational preparations that should have followed.

“What is no less serious than the failure itself,” he said, “is the attempt to cover it up. Some of the information simply did not appear in the investigations. A narrative was created that shifts responsibility downward while protecting the senior command. In my view, that is one of the gravest problems.”

According to Solomon, a separate review committee led by Maj. Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman rejected the Navy’s investigation, along with several other central investigative reports, concluding that they fell short of the professional standards expected.

Solomon closed by warning that Israel cannot afford to learn only part of the lessons from October 7.

“There are incidents the public knows nothing about,” he said. “If we don’t study them thoroughly and present the full picture, they could happen again. We must not cover things up. We have to understand what really happened in order to prevent the next disaster.”

{Matzav.com}