“We caught a ship yesterday that had some things on it, which wasn’t very nice. A gift from China, perhaps; I don’t know. But I was a little surprised because I have a very good relationship, and I thought I had an understanding with President Xi.”
—President Trump, speaking on April 15 to reporters about an apparent shipment of weapons from China to Iran, despite saying earlier that month that China had agreed not to supply that country with them.
With the war in Iran stalled, the United States’ position in the Middle East is facing scrutiny. America has long been seen as the strongest, most desirable partner to countries in the region, particularly in regard to security, and, for many, trade and investment. But the stalemate has prompted regional powers to reconsider their options—chief among them China, the only superpower capable of challenging American influence, and one that already has some strong ties in the Middle East.
The change in dynamics raises the question: What are China’s long-term plans in the Middle East?
Not a big player
While China is heavily involved in the Middle East, it is far from the largest trading partner in the region, and its engagement there remains secondary to its other global partnerships.
According to an Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) report by researcher Ori Sela, China’s total trading volume with Middle Eastern countries—excluding Israel—is $495 billion. (With the inclusion of Israel, that rises to $517 billion.) That figure is eclipsed by its trade with Southeast Asia ($1.05 trillion), the European Union ($828 billion), the US ($559 billion), and Latin America ($549 billion).
Currently, China’s primary interest in the Middle East is transactional: the region, including Iran, supplies half of China’s energy imports, balanced by Chinese consumer exports and emerging tech investments, like Alibaba’s data centers in Dubai. Chinese imports of goods from the Middle East have dropped, but their exports have continued.
The US, however, has much stronger tech ties in the region—and security ties as well.
China’s military presence in the region is limited to an anti-piracy force, which is dwarfed by the sheer number of American bases and military partnerships in that part of the world.
A neutral voice in a tough neighborhood?
China’s diplomatic posture in the region is cautious and perhaps intentionally ambiguous.
Direct meetings between Chinese officials and Middle Eastern leaders have almost entirely taken place at the level of ministerial positions. Although President Xi has previously conducted high-profile state visits to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, currently, rather than traveling to the region, Xi is utilizing a “home-court diplomacy” approach, hosting Middle Eastern and Gulf leaders in Beijing.
And while the Chinese have been willing to discuss major conflicts such as Gaza and Israel, they avoid any deeper political engagement, preferring to focus on economic issues. They evidently seek to present themselves as economic partners who represent stability through trade and investment rather than military involvement.
In his report, Sela notes that the number of visits to the region by Chinese officials has risen. While there were 15 to 20 reciprocal ministerial visits in 2024, that number went up to 25 to 30 such visits in 2025. Still, China has made no alliances or military pacts.
There have been reports of China transferring arms to various countries in the region, including Egypt and Iran, but Sela and other analysts say they remain unconfirmed. China may have also provided Iran with targeting imagery, but they clearly aren’t assuming any explicit military role.