The Supreme Court on Thursday authorized the release of the identity of a senior Israeli military intelligence officer believed to have played a significant role in the intelligence failures preceding Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel.

The officer was identified as Lt. Col. Aryeh Amidror, who served as the Gaza Division’s intelligence chief. The division is responsible for the Gaza Strip and the surrounding border area, and Amidror held the position both before and during the October 7 assault.

In the days leading up to the attack, Amidror reportedly rejected detailed intelligence warnings from a female noncommissioned officer who had identified indications of an impending Hamas offensive. He reportedly characterized her assessment as “completely imaginary.”

In November 2025, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir removed several senior military officers from their positions over their involvement in the failures surrounding October 7. Amidror was among those dismissed.

However, Amidror was not formally discharged from military service until last month, following a lengthy legal effort to challenge his removal. He also pursued legal action to prevent his name from being publicly identified, despite the fact that his identity had already circulated widely online.

Amidror’s father, retired general and former national security adviser Yaakov Amidror, has frequently appeared on Israeli television discussing national security issues without revealing his son’s connection to the October 7 failures. He had also previously expressed opposition to establishing a state commission of inquiry into the events.

Unlike several other senior IDF commanders who resigned after acknowledging their responsibility for the intelligence and operational failures, Amidror did not voluntarily step down or publicly accept responsibility. Instead, he remained in his position as Gaza Division intelligence chief until the conclusion of his scheduled tenure.

Following that assignment, he was selected for a position within the Military Intelligence Directorate’s Unit 9900, which focuses on visual intelligence, commonly known as VISINT. However, in January 2025, the military suspended the planned appointment after a radio report brought attention to the controversial decision.

In the period immediately preceding October 7, Amidror dismissed warnings from a noncommissioned officer serving in the IDF’s signals intelligence Unit 8200. The officer had repeatedly raised concerns that Hamas possessed a detailed and actionable plan to launch an attack against Israel.

The NCO, identified publicly as “Vav” — the first Hebrew letter of her name — sent an urgent email to several military officers, including Amidror, warning of the impending danger. In her message, she wrote that “the sword is coming,” and urged officials to “warn the people” before it was too late.

Her warning came after Unit 8200 circulated an intelligence assessment on September 19, less than three weeks before the October 7 massacre. The report warned that Hamas was conducting preparations for a major invasion of Israeli territory.

The document provided a detailed breakdown of Hamas’s operational plans, describing training exercises conducted by the group’s elite forces. These exercises included simulated raids on Israeli communities and military installations. Hamas operatives had also reportedly studied procedures for capturing Israeli soldiers and civilians, transporting them into Gaza, and determining the circumstances under which hostages could be killed.

The operational blueprint, known as the Jericho Wall plan, had initially been presented to intelligence officials in a 40-page document more than a year before the October 7 attack.

After officials appeared to disregard the September 19 intelligence assessment, “Vav” sent another warning explaining the significance of the training exercises. She wrote that “the training shows us that the ‘Jericho Wall’ plan is an operative, practiced plan, meaning that Hamas already has forces that have practiced these outlines and know how to implement when the order comes.”

The email also cautioned that the apparent proximity of Hamas’s planned operation meant Israeli intelligence might no longer have sufficient time to stop an attack before it began. Rather than relying solely on preventing the assault, Vav urged officials to start “formulating plans for dealing with the incident, should it actually happen, in order to reduce the damage.”

Amidror responded to her warning with a dismissive assessment, writing that “the described scenario is completely imaginary.”

Less than three weeks later, Hamas carried out the very type of operation described in the intelligence warnings. On October 7, 2023, thousands of Hamas-led terrorists breached the Gaza border and attacked communities and military positions throughout southern Israel. Approximately 1,200 people were murdered, and 251 others were abducted and taken into Gaza.

The intelligence failures were not limited to the written warnings from Unit 8200. In the months preceding the assault, Amidror was also reportedly among the officials who disregarded information provided by IDF surveillance soldiers monitoring Hamas activity along the Gaza border.

At least three months before the attack, female surveillance soldiers stationed at the Nahal Oz military base began reporting unusual developments along the border, which was approximately one kilometer from their position.

Their reports described Hamas operatives repeatedly conducting training exercises, digging into the ground and installing explosives near the border fence. The soldiers also identified patterns of activity that they considered unusual and potentially dangerous.

According to the soldiers’ accounts, despite repeatedly reporting these developments to their commanders and other relevant officials, their warnings did not result in meaningful action.