Israel was prepared to shoot down Flydubai Flight 1073 — despite more than 150 Israelis being aboard — if the hijacked passenger jet had continued toward the country and was determined to be heading for Ben Gurion Airport, the Azrieli towers or another major target, according to Israeli officials with direct knowledge of the dramatic military response to last week’s attempted terror attack.

The extraordinary details reveal how close the September 30 incident came to forcing Israel’s leadership to confront one of the most agonizing decisions imaginable: destroy an airliner filled largely with Israeli passengers or risk allowing terrorists to use it as a weapon in a 9/11-style attack that could kill hundreds or thousands more on the ground.

Two Israeli sources familiar with the response said Israel has long maintained and rehearsed procedures for precisely such a scenario. Those protocols were activated within minutes after Flydubai Flight FZ1073, traveling from Dubai to Tel Aviv, suddenly plunged thousands of feet and stopped responding to Israeli Air Force attempts to contact the cockpit.

The Boeing 737 MAX was carrying more than 170 passengers, most of them Israelis, when co-pilot Hamam al-Hammami allegedly attacked Captain Smit Machchhar in the cockpit with an emergency crash axe and attempted to seize control of the aircraft. Investigators now believe al-Hammami had planned the attack before he was even hired by Flydubai and intended to crash the jet into Ben Gurion Airport.

Flight-tracking information and accounts from officials indicate that the aircraft lost more than 14,000 feet in a matter of seconds during the struggle in the cockpit. Some flight-tracking data showed an even larger plunge of more than 16,000 feet. Israeli officials said the Air Force detected that the plane had deviated from its expected course and was descending at an alarming rate.

Israeli controllers attempted to establish communications with the cockpit but received no response. An emergency alert subsequently indicated that the aircraft was facing a hijacking rather than an ordinary mechanical problem.

The Israeli response was almost immediate. A previously designated emergency committee was activated, a command center was established, Israeli airspace was closed and fighter aircraft were scrambled. Officials involved in the response were already considering the possibility that Israel was facing an attempted repeat of the September 11 attacks in the United States.

According to Israeli officials, the decision to close Israeli airspace came roughly 90 seconds after the seriousness of the incident became apparent. Fighter jets were ordered into the air seconds later, with the critical sequence unfolding in only two to three minutes.

The Israeli fighters ultimately did not have to intercept the aircraft. While still roughly 400 miles from Israel, Flight 1073 turned toward Saudi Arabia, and Saudi fighter aircraft were scrambled to respond. Once Israeli officials understood that the plane was moving away from Israel and that Saudi forces were taking action, the Israeli jets were recalled.

Had the Flydubai aircraft continued toward Israel and crossed a predetermined threshold, however, Israeli fighter jets would have been dispatched into Jordanian airspace to intercept and investigate it, according to officials familiar with the protocol.

The Israeli pilots would first have approached the airliner as closely as possible and attempted to visually inspect the cockpit, including trying to establish visual contact with whoever was at the controls. They would then have examined the passenger cabin for indications of panic, violence or other evidence that the aircraft had been hijacked.

Their observations would have been transmitted back to the Air Force and the emergency committee. If authorities concluded that the aircraft had indeed been seized and those controlling it remained radio-silent and made no demands, the situation would have been escalated directly to Israel’s defense minister and prime minister.

Under Israel’s established protocol, an unresponsive rogue aircraft determined to be approaching Israel as a weapon can ultimately be shot down. The authority to give that final order, however, rests with the prime minister.

Israeli officials said that in such a nightmare scenario, destroying an aircraft containing more than 150 Israelis could be considered necessary if the alternative were allowing the plane to strike Ben Gurion Airport, Tel Aviv’s Azrieli towers or another “high-value target.”

The disclosure adds a new dimension to the extraordinary events aboard Flight 1073, where the passengers had no idea that Israeli military authorities were simultaneously preparing for the possibility that the aircraft itself might have to be destroyed.

The catastrophe was averted largely because Machchhar, despite suffering severe injuries in the cockpit attack, managed to fight back long enough to unlock the cockpit door. His action allowed Flydubai personnel and Israeli passengers to enter the cockpit and overpower al-Hammami.

Machchhar has since described how the attack began after his co-pilot asked for permission to pray. Several minutes later, while the captain was looking away, al-Hammami allegedly struck him repeatedly from behind with the cockpit’s emergency axe.

“But then, after that, the blows kept coming, one after the other,” Machchhar later recalled. “That’s when I realized that it’s not the aircraft, it’s the other guy who was in the cockpit with me.”

Although badly wounded and struggling to see, Machchhar succeeded in opening the reinforced cockpit door. Passengers and crew then rushed in and subdued the alleged attacker. Two off-duty pilots traveling aboard the flight subsequently took control of the aircraft and diverted it to Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, where it landed safely.

The entire airborne emergency lasted roughly 15 minutes, according to officials familiar with the response.

The investigation has since produced increasingly disturbing evidence suggesting that the incident was a premeditated terror plot rather than a spontaneous attack.

An Israeli official said al-Hammami told interrogators in the United Arab Emirates that he had conceived of the attack before joining Flydubai. Investigators believe his objective was to seize an aircraft bound for Israel and crash it into Ben Gurion Airport.

Investigators are also examining reports that al-Hammami had previously considered carrying out an attack on another flight but abandoned the plan because someone he knew was aboard. Authorities are reviewing his previous trips, contacts and travel to determine whether he was recruited, assisted or directed by a terrorist organization.

The current Israeli assessment is that al-Hammami probably acted as a lone wolf, but officials have stressed that the investigation remains active and that other possibilities have not been eliminated.

Al-Hammami was initially taken into custody in Saudi Arabia following the emergency landing and was subsequently transferred to the United Arab Emirates. Israeli Shin Bet personnel have traveled to the UAE and are participating in the investigation alongside Emirati authorities.

The investigation is also focusing heavily on how al-Hammami was permitted to become a Flydubai pilot despite apparent warning signs in his background.

According to officials familiar with his history, al-Hammami had previously worked as a co-pilot trainee with Oman Air and was identified as a security concern in 2024 after extremist material was allegedly discovered in his possession. He was grounded from flying for approximately a year but was permitted to remain with the airline in an administrative position before later leaving Oman Air.

Al-Hammami subsequently moved to Dubai and was hired by Flydubai. Officials familiar with the case have said Flydubai did not obtain sufficient information from the Omani government about his previous security concerns before placing him in the cockpit.

Investigators have also uncovered social-media material that has added to concerns about his radicalization. At one point, al-Hammami reportedly posted footage of El Al aircraft in Dubai together with an image of slain Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

The case has triggered investigations and reviews beyond Israel and the UAE because al-Hammami had studied or spent time in several countries. Authorities are examining his history to determine when his alleged radicalization occurred and whether anyone assisted him in preparing the attack.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has ordered a broad review of security procedures involving foreign airlines flying into Israel, particularly the vetting of foreign pilots and other crew members who are permitted to enter Israeli airspace and land at Ben Gurion Airport.

The episode has raised serious questions about how an individual previously identified as a potential security risk could pass through multiple layers of airline, government and Israeli aviation screening and ultimately serve as co-pilot on a passenger aircraft bound directly for Israel.

Flydubai has said that “an altercation occurred in the flight deck” and that the aircraft “was successfully secured by on-duty FlyDubai crew traveling on the flight, who diverted and landed the aircraft safely” in Saudi Arabia.

The airline has also said that “all passengers and crew are safe and accounted for,” while cautioning that “at this early stage, the underlying reasons and motives behind this event are unknown and remain subject to a formal investigation.”

{Matzav.com}