By Rabbi Aryeh Lebowitz

And G-d blessed the seventh day and He hallowed it, for thereon He abstained from all His work that G-d created to

do. ~ Bereishis 2:3 Is a woman obligated to recite havdalah? Traditionally, a man recites havdalah and a woman fulfills this mitzvah by listening. However, is this merely a social phenomenon or is there halachic basis to discourage women from reciting havdalah themselves?

Is Havdalah a Torah or Rabbinic Mitzvah?

Before we understand a woman’s obligation, we must first analyze the fundamental mitzvah of havdalah, both in terms of its source and the level of obligation. The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 29:1, Sefer HaMitzvos mitzvah 155) writes that there is a Torah obligation to sanctify the Shabbos both when it begins and when it ends, and this is accomplished by reciting the text of kiddush at the onset of Shabbos and havdalah at the conclusion. Thus, while the specific formulation as printed in our siddurim is rabbinic, the basic obligation of both kiddush and havdalah is from the Torah.

However, the Maggid Mishneh on the Rambam and the Teshuvos HaRosh (11:3) argue that although kiddush is a Torah obligation, havdalah is fully rabbinic. These two views may revolve around a fundamental dispute as to the purpose of the mitzvah of kiddush. The Rambam maintains that kiddush is meant to praise the day and to speak of its holiness and goodness, which is appropriate both at the beginning and at the end of Shabbos. However, the Maggid Mishneh and the Rosh understand that the mitzvah of kiddush is to sanctify the day and endow it with holiness, similar to the way that the beis din sanctifies Rosh Chodesh. The act of sanctifying and infusing holiness into the day only makes sense at its beginning. According to this perspective, havdalah cannot be considered part of the Torah mitzvah of kiddush and must be a distinct obligation.

Are Women Obligated?

Generally, women are exempt from time-bound positive mitzvos — “mitzvos aseh shehazman grama,” however, the mitzvos of Shabbos are an important exception to this rule. The Gemara (Berachos 20b) notes a discrepancy in the wording of the mitzvah of Shabbos between the first and second recordings of the Aseres HaDibros: in the first recording of the Ten Commandments (Shemos 20:8), the Torah commands “zachor,” “remember the Shabbos to make it holy,” while in the second recording of the ten commandments (Devarim 5:12) the Torah commands “shamor,” “guard the Shabbos to make it holy.” The Gemara explains that Hashem spoke both words, “remember” and “guard” simultaneously, and that anyone obligated in one must be obligated in the other. In other words, the mitzvos of zechiras Shabbos and shemiras Shabbos are intertwined and cannot be separated. Since women are obligated in “guarding” Shabbos, which includes refraining from performing the thirty-nine prohibited categories of work on Shabbos, they are also obligated in “remembering” Shabbos, which is the source of the positive mitzvah to recite kiddush and sanctify the Shabbos.

While one could argue that zechirah only refers to the mitzvah of kiddush (and reasonably conclude that the only positive mitzvah of Shabbos that women are obligated in is kiddush), the Ran (Shabbos 44a (Rif) s.v. VeKasav) explains that the derivation of the Gemara obligates women in all the positive aspects of Shabbos, including the obligation to eat three meals. Rabbeinu Tam, on the other hand, while agreeing that women are obligated in eating the three meals of Shabbos, suggests that the basis of their obligation is in keeping with the rule of af hen hayu b’oso hanes — they too were involved in the miracle (of the manna). He does not cite the connection between zachor and shamor, because he seemingly limits that source to obligate women in kiddush alone (and possibly havdalah) and not the other mitzvos of Shabbos. Essentially, while the Ran obligates women in all positive mitzvos of Shabbos based on the link between zachor and shamor, Rabbeinu Tam requires a separate source to obligate them in each positive mitzvah of Shabbos, and absent a source they would remain exempt. Based on the above background, there are two reasons to suggest that women are obligated in havdalah. First, if we accept the Rambam’s view, that “zechira” includes havdalah, then women would indeed be obligated to recite havdalah on a Torah level, just as they are obligated in kiddush. Second, even if we assume that havdalah is not included in “zechira” and is a rabbinic enactment, the Ran argues that women are obligated in all the positive mitzvos of Shabbos, which would, at first glance, include havdalah.

However, others, including the Orchos Chaim (1, Hilchos Havdalah), rule that women are totally exempt from havdalah since it is a time-bound, positive mitzvah. These authorities must hold that the mitzvah of zachor is limited to kiddush and does not include havdalah. Furthermore, they would seem to follow Rabbeinu Tam’s view that the derivation that links zachor and shamor is limited to kiddush and not the other positive mitzvos of Shabbos. Alternatively, even if these authorities understand that the connection between zachor and shamor obligates women in all the positive mitzvos of Shabbos, as the Ran asserts, they can argue that only the mitzvos that are practiced on Shabbos itself are included. Havdalah, though, which is a mitzvah ideally observed after the conclusion of Shabbos, is not included, and thus women are not obligated.

Practical Halacha

The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 296:8), following the Rambam, rules that women are obligated in havdalah just as they are obligated in kiddush, though he does note that some disagree. Based on the dissenting opinion that exempts women from havdalah, the Rema rules that women should not recite havdalah for themselves and instead fulfill their obligation by hearing it from a man. The Magen Avraham (296:11) cites the Bach, who questions the Rema’s ruling, arguing that the Rema himself, following the opinion of Tosafos (Berachos 14a), permits women to recite a beracha on a mitzvah they voluntarily perform, even if they are not obligated to do so. Therefore, even if we assume that a woman is exempt from reciting havdalah, she should still be permitted to do so if she chooses. The Bach, therefore, concludes that even if a man is present and she can hear havdalah from him, a woman is still permitted to recite havdalah for herself.

The Magen Avraham, however, suggests that perhaps the Rema distinguishes between reciting a beracha on the performance of a mitzvah, such as lulav or shofar, which Ashkenazim would encourage, and reciting the beracha for havdalah, which is discouraged. In a case where the mitzvah itself is a separate action, independent of the beracha, a woman can perform the mitzvah and recite a beracha. However, when the entirety of the mitzvah is the recitation of the beracha, perhaps the Rema would not permit a woman to volunteer. We can understand this distinction based on a comment of the Nesivos HaMishpat (C.M. 234), who writes that regarding a Torah obligation, the chefzta, the object or action that is mandated or proscribed, is inherently holy (or impure) and thus when a woman performs the mitzvah, even if she is not obligated, her act is meaningful. However, regarding a rabbinic obligation, the cheftza is not inherently holy (or impure) and there is only a chiyuv on the gavra, a personal obligation to fulfill the halacha. Thus, when the entire obligation is a rabbinic beracha, there is no inherent fulfillment independent of an obligation, and since a woman is not obligated, she cannot volunteer to do it. The Taz (296:7), however, offers an alternative explanation for the Rema’s position that women should not recite havdalah themselves. He explains that we permit women to recite a beracha on a mitzvah that they are not obligated to perform when men are obligated to perform that same mitzvah on a Torah level. Since they are only one step removed from the biblical obligation (due to it being a time-bound mitzvah), they can recite a beracha.

However, when a mitzvah, such as havdalah, is itself rabbinic even for men (following those who disagree with the Rambam), and women are additionally exempt since it is a positive, time-bound mitzvah, they may not recite a beracha when fulfilling it, since they are two steps removed from a Torah command. The Taz adds that if a woman wants to daven Maariv and recite atah chonantanu she is certainly permitted to do so, since it is contained within a beracha that she is already saying and is not its own separate beracha.

In the final analysis, due to the different opinions on this matter, a woman should try to hear havdalah from a man, but if no man is available, she can certainly recite havdalah for herself, since according to the majority opinion she is obligated in the mitzvah.