More than 1,200 foreign airline crew members from countries that do not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel have been permitted to enter the country since the beginning of 2026, including citizens of Syria, Lebanon and Oman, according to newly revealed figures that are raising fresh questions about Israel’s screening of foreign aviation personnel.

The number, reported Tuesday by Kan News, has taken on particular significance following the attempted hijacking of a FlyDubai flight bound for Tel Aviv, after it emerged that the Omani co-pilot accused of carrying out the attack had previously drawn the attention of authorities in his own country over concerns about extremist activity.

The figure does not mean that the 1,200 crew members were suspected of terrorism or other wrongdoing. Rather, it highlights the extent to which foreign airline personnel from countries ordinarily subject to heightened Israeli entry restrictions routinely arrive as part of international flight crews — and has fueled questions about exactly how those individuals are vetted before being permitted to fly into Israel.

The Omani co-pilot at the center of the FlyDubai attack, Imam Al-Hamami, had not previously escaped the notice of authorities. According to reports that emerged following the attack, Omani officials had become concerned about his online activity and what they regarded as an excessive interest in radical ideology.

Those concerns were serious enough that Al-Hamami was reportedly removed from flying duties at Oman Air, the country’s national carrier. He was transferred to an office position and sent through an anti-extremism program.

But the information apparently stopped there. The Wall Street Journal reported that the concerns surrounding Al-Hamami were not transmitted to other relevant authorities or entered into a system that would have prevented him from obtaining another aviation job abroad.

Al-Hamami subsequently secured employment with FlyDubai. According to information published since the attack, the airline did not approach Omani authorities for a detailed account of his previous employment or the reasons he had stopped flying for Oman Air. Instead, the hiring process reportedly relied on a criminal-background check that did not reveal the earlier security concerns.

The apparent gap proved particularly consequential because Al-Hamami was not merely hired as a commercial pilot. He was assigned to routes serving Israel and had reportedly flown into the country several times before the attempted hijacking without being identified as a potential security threat.

Only after the attack did investigators begin piecing together the history of warnings surrounding him. Reuters reported that Al-Hamami subsequently told investigators in the United Arab Emirates that he had planned the attack even before FlyDubai hired him, a revelation that has intensified scrutiny of how he was able to secure the position and repeatedly operate flights to Israel.

Authorities in the UAE are now examining the conduct of FlyDubai personnel involved in hiring Al-Hamami and whether proper procedures were followed before he was permitted to fly for the carrier.

Investigators in Abu Dhabi and Yerushalayim are also reportedly examining whether Al-Hamami’s radicalization may have begun earlier, including during a period in which he lived in Australia. Authorities are seeking to reconstruct his activities and determine when warning signs first appeared and whether information existed that could have prevented him from gaining access to an Israel-bound cockpit.

The attempted attack has now expanded into a broader examination of the system governing foreign airline crews entering Israel. Unlike ordinary travelers, airline personnel operate under specialized aviation procedures, raising questions about which Israeli agency is ultimately responsible for ensuring that potentially dangerous crew members are identified before they reach the country.

Transportation Minister Miri Regev said over the weekend that the responsibility for intelligence screening and security vetting of foreign flight crews does not rest with the Transportation Ministry. She said those duties belong to Israel’s security authorities.

The Wall Street Journal, however, has reported that the failures were not confined to FlyDubai or Oman. Its reporting also pointed to shortcomings on the Israeli side, including within the mechanisms overseen by Israeli authorities and the Transportation Ministry for screening foreign airline crews entering the country.

The disclosure that more than 1,200 crew members from countries without diplomatic relations with Israel have entered since January is now adding urgency to that dispute. Among those personnel were citizens of countries that remain formally hostile to Israel, including Syria and Lebanon, as well as Oman, which has no diplomatic relations with Israel.

The central question facing investigators is no longer only how Al-Hamami was hired by FlyDubai, but how information about a pilot who had reportedly already been flagged for extremist concerns failed to follow him through the international aviation system — and how he was subsequently able to fly repeatedly into Israel before allegedly attempting to bring down a passenger aircraft bound for Tel Aviv.

{Matzav.com}