Lt. Col. Aryeh Amidror, the Gaza Division’s intelligence officer at the time of the Oct. 7 massacre, is denying that he bears professional or command responsibility for the failure to warn of Hamas’s impending invasion, arguing in newly released court documents that providing strategic warning of war was not the responsibility of divisional intelligence.

Amidror’s defense comes amid a bitter battle over the IDF’s decision to end his military career following investigations into the catastrophic intelligence and command failures preceding Oct. 7. His identity was kept from the public for nearly three years before Israel’s Supreme Court ruled last week that his name could be published.

The newly disclosed documents stem from a petition Amidror filed in March 2026 challenging the process to terminate his career service. The proceedings initially remained confidential, and even after his arguments were rejected, the filings continued to be covered by a gag order. Their release now provides the fullest picture yet of Amidror’s effort to contest the conclusions reached by the military about his conduct.

Amidror, the son of Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, a former Israeli national security adviser, served as the Gaza Division intelligence officer during the period leading up to the Hamas invasion and on the morning of Oct. 7 itself. He had also previously served as head of the division’s targets branch, giving him years of experience with Gaza and its intelligence picture.

One of the central issues in the case concerns the warnings of a female noncommissioned officer in the IDF’s elite Unit 8200, identified publicly only as “Vav,” who studied Hamas training exercises in the months before the massacre and warned that they could reflect preparations for an actual invasion.

Amidror argues that far from ignoring the issue, it was he who directed that Hamas’s exercises be studied in the first place.

“Upon assuming my position as Gaza Division intelligence officer, I instructed a certain body within Unit 8200 to find Hamas training exercises in order to assess the enemy’s tactical capabilities,” the documents state. According to Amidror, “following an instruction given by the petitioner and at the direction of her commanders, the NCO found the exercise.”

The court papers include correspondence between Amidror and the NCO as their disagreement over the meaning of the Hamas exercises developed.

“To be clear, the purpose of my email was not to bring the assessment down but to raise it. In any event, I don’t think this is a point of ‘absolute and unequivocal disagreement,’ because clearly, as more material is distributed, the area of agreement will grow. We are at the beginning of the process.”

Amidror points to that correspondence as evidence that he did not simply dismiss the NCO’s work. He also says he initiated a discussion “with the aim of challenging the prevailing concept and examining the division’s underlying assumptions regarding the possibility that Hamas had the capability and intention to carry out a single or large-scale raid.”

According to Amidror, a summary of that discussion was circulated as high as the office of the IDF chief of staff, showing that he was actively attempting “to undermine and challenge the underlying assumptions.” He contends that those efforts were not properly considered when military leaders decided to remove him from service.

Other evidence presented in the investigations, however, has painted a sharply different picture of his handling of the warnings. Amidror has previously been reported to have dismissed the Hamas mass-invasion scenario contained in the so-called “Jericho Wall” plan as a “completely imaginary scenario,” despite warnings from Unit 8200 and Gaza border observers.

The Jericho Wall document described with remarkable detail a Hamas assault involving rocket fire, drones, the breaching of Israel’s border defenses and large numbers of terrorists pouring into Israeli communities and military bases — elements that would ultimately materialize on the morning of Oct. 7.

The newly released court material also exposes what the IDF views as significant weaknesses in Amidror’s argument that he meaningfully challenged the prevailing conception. The Unit 8200 NCO whose work was at the center of the issue was not invited to the discussion and was not given the opportunity to personally present her assessment.

The Gaza Division commander was also not immediately briefed about the intelligence developments, while the discussion on the issue was scheduled for after the holidays. Amidror himself acknowledges the timing in his petition, and the delay has become a key point in the dispute over whether his actions amounted to a meaningful real-time challenge to the prevailing assessment of Hamas’s intentions.

The most consequential argument in Amidror’s filing goes considerably further. He rejects the IDF’s contention that the failure to provide adequate warning falls within his professional responsibility at all.

“The petitioner denies the claim that he failed professionally or bears command or professional responsibility for the failure to provide a warning of war,” the filing states.

It then declares: “The mission of providing a warning of war is not the responsibility of division intelligence.”

The IDF emphatically rejects that interpretation of the job Amidror held.

In its response to his petition, the military describes the Gaza Division intelligence officer’s responsibilities in broad terms: “The Gaza Division intelligence officer leads all intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination efforts in the sector – management of the intelligence picture, warning, collection and research, and command advisory.”

The IDF’s assessment of Amidror’s performance is severe. Military investigators concluded that the failures were not limited to a single judgment made in the hours immediately before the massacre, but included his handling of intelligence during the period leading up to the attack.

The military states that it identified “a series of professional errors and failures in the petitioner’s conduct on the night preceding October 7, as well as beforehand, in assessing the security risk posed by the Hamas terrorist organization.”

The IDF further rejected Amidror’s attempt to separate his personal conduct from his command responsibility for the intelligence apparatus operating beneath him.

“The petitioner bears personal responsibility for the failures identified in his conduct – in the manner in which he exercised his judgment, the degree of oversight he maintained, and the level of professionalism he demonstrated in his position. Command responsibility means the commander’s responsibility for what occurs in the unit under his authority.”

The disciplinary process against Amidror followed a broader examination of the IDF’s internal Oct. 7 investigations by an expert team headed by Maj. Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman. The review concluded, among other things, that the Gaza Division had failed to sufficiently engage with the Jericho Wall invasion plan from both an intelligence and operational standpoint.

On Nov. 23, 2025, the IDF chief of staff determined that a series of senior commanders bore command responsibility for failures connected to Oct. 7 and ordered command measures against several officers, including Amidror. A subsequent recommendation from the deputy chief of staff called for ending Amidror’s career-service commitment.

Amidror challenged that process in court, describing his treatment as discriminatory, selective and arbitrary. The administrative court ultimately rejected his petition and allowed the IDF process to proceed. In September, the military formally announced that his career service would be terminated.

The IDF also argued that Amidror’s legal theory could have ramifications far beyond his individual case. Military commanders, it said, must retain the ability to impose command consequences even when an officer’s actions do not necessarily amount to individual legal wrongdoing.

If courts were to restrict command sanctions solely to questions of individual legal liability, the IDF warned, it could severely constrain the chief of staff’s authority to hold commanders accountable for failures occurring under their leadership.

“This result must not be permitted,” the military wrote.

Amidror, meanwhile, maintains that he has been singled out to bear consequences for a failure that extended throughout Israel’s intelligence and military leadership.

“The petitioner is the only commander in the IDF who is paying a real price, in the form of the loss of his rights, for the failures of the military and the state concerning intelligence and warnings about the intentions of the Hamas terrorist organization,” he argued.

His filing points to senior figures who held key positions on Oct. 7, including commanders in Southern Command, the Operations Directorate, the Gaza Division and Unit 8200. Amidror argues that those officers were able to complete their service and leave the IDF while preserving their pension and other benefits, while the termination of his career service leaves him facing a different financial and professional outcome.

Amidror also fought to keep his identity from being made public, but that battle ended last week when the Supreme Court lifted the publication restriction. The court cited the absence of a security reason to continue concealing his name, the fact that his identity had already circulated publicly and the strong public interest in identifying a senior intelligence officer whom the IDF had held responsible for failures connected to Oct. 7.

With the gag order lifted, Amidror’s defense is now playing out publicly for the first time, exposing a fundamental clash over one of the central questions left by the Oct. 7 catastrophe: where responsibility for recognizing Hamas’s intentions and providing a warning ultimately rested — and who should personally pay the price for failing to do so.

{Matzav.com}