Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has released new internal records from the weeks leading up to the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack, revealing senior defense officials repeatedly described the Gaza front as “stable” and urging restraint, even as the country stood on the brink of its deadliest security failure.

The documents, published as part of Netanyahu’s response to a state inquiry, were submitted to State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman on Dec. 25, 2025, and were made public on Thursday. They form part of the prime minister’s effort to shift responsibility for the Oct. 7 collapse toward Israel’s military and intelligence leadership.

Among the most striking revelations is a transcript from a Sept. 12, 2023, cabinet meeting, less than a month before the Hamas invasion. In that session, then-defense minister Yoav Gallant described the security situation in Gaza as “stable” and urged Israel to “hold back its forces” against Hamas.

Gallant, who was later fired by Netanyahu during the war, also pushed for a long-term arrangement with Hamas to preserve calm along the border.

The document shows that senior officials were convinced that deterrence and limited engagement were working and that escalation should be avoided.

Netanyahu’s submission also includes a summary of a Sept. 21, 2023, security assessment led by then-IDF chief of staff Herzi Halevi. According to the report, Halevi believed it was possible to “create a positive direction with Hamas” through economic incentives and gradual stabilization.

Ten days before the attack, intelligence officials delivered mixed but largely reassuring messages. A representative of the IDF’s Military Intelligence Directorate warned that Hamas “does want to reach an escalation,” while Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar said the group “very much wants to avoid a round of fighting.”

Bar, whom Netanyahu later dismissed during the war, is a central figure in the prime minister’s account. Netanyahu highlights multiple statements in which Bar assessed that quiet had returned to the border and that a “deeper arrangement” with Hamas was possible.

Through carefully selected excerpts, Netanyahu seeks to present himself as the lone senior figure consistently pushing for tougher measures while ministers and security chiefs focused on buying time and maintaining calm.

Netanyahu’s response also includes a detailed timeline of his actions on the morning of the Hamas assault.

According to the document, at 6:29 a.m., his military secretary, Maj. Gen. Avi Gil, informed him that an attack had begun.

Fifteen minutes later, at 6:44 a.m., Netanyahu asked whether Israel could eliminate Hamas leaders and whether reservists should be mobilized.

He arrived at IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv at 8 a.m. By 9:55 a.m., he ordered the Gaza border sealed “hermetically” to prevent further infiltrations and hostage-taking. He also instructed officials to carry out a full reserve call-up, prepare for possible attacks from the north, and begin planning a ground invasion of Gaza.

Perhaps most controversially, Netanyahu reveals excerpts from a Shin Bet situational assessment that concluded shortly before the attack, at 5:15 a.m. In the fragmented quotes he shares, the assessment stated that the likelihood of a broad conflict with Hamas was low and that Israeli actions should focus on preventing isolated incidents rather than risking miscalculation and war.

Netanyahu emphasizes that the summary contained no directive to update his military secretary, arguing that critical information never reached him in time.

“Nowhere is there an instruction to inform my office,” he notes, bolstering his claim that key warnings were withheld.

The release deepens an already fierce public battle over responsibility for Israel’s worst security disaster. Families of Oct. 7 victims and many opposition lawmakers accuse Netanyahu of years of strategic complacency and political maneuvering that weakened Israel’s readiness. They argue that intelligence failures and misjudgments occurred under his watch — regardless of what advisers recommended.

Netanyahu, facing mounting political and legal pressure, is using the comptroller’s inquiry to construct a counter-narrative: that he warned, questioned, and pushed for action, while the security establishment consistently underestimated Hamas.

The documents do not resolve that dispute. But they reveal how, in the weeks before Oct. 7, Israel’s leadership — from cabinet ministers to intelligence chiefs — remained divided, uncertain, and ultimately wrong about Hamas’s intentions.

(YWN World Headquarters – NYC)