Dozens of Russian intelligence officers expelled from Western countries following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have resurfaced in Japan under diplomatic and commercial cover, turning the country into a key hub for acquiring sensitive technology for Moscow’s war machine, according to a New York Times investigation.

At the center of the network is a covert unit of Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU, known as the 20th Directorate. Current and former officials from five Western intelligence agencies told the newspaper that officers from the unit pose as diplomats and businessmen, purchasing or stealing sensitive technology for battlefield use and transferring it to Russia through shipping companies and third countries.

According to the officials, the unit existed before the war in Ukraine but became a central part of the Kremlin’s procurement effort after the invasion, seeking microchips, transmitters, weapons-manufacturing machinery, and advanced components whose export to Russia has been banned.

The operation in Tokyo is reportedly led by Maksim Vladimirovich Pilchenkov, a 49-year-old GRU officer officially employed by Russia’s state-owned airline Aeroflot. His office is located on the 22nd floor of a tower in central Tokyo, about a 10-minute walk from Japan’s National Police Agency headquarters. Pilchenkov arrived in Japan in February 2024, after previously serving there, and allegedly used his experience to establish relationships with shipping companies transporting goods from Japan to Russia.

The investigation states that GRU officers have used Aeroflot positions as intelligence cover for decades. Although Aeroflot has largely ceased operating flights to Japan because of difficulties obtaining spare parts and services, its local partners continue shipping cargo through countries where Aeroflot still operates, including Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan, before the goods are forwarded to Russia.

One of those partners is Japanese logistics company Proco Air, which describes itself as a “bridge between Japan and Russia.” According to Western intelligence officials, such shipping arrangements are essential to the 20th Directorate because the equipment only needs to reach a third country willing to resell or transfer it to Russia.

The report says Japan is the world’s largest exporter of some of the sensitive dual-use technologies Russia is seeking. It adds that Vietnam has become the largest destination for sensitive Japanese technology while simultaneously becoming the largest exporter of those same types of products to Russia.

Takehiko Miki, owner of Proco Air, said he met Pilchenkov in 2018 but only began working closely with him after his return to Tokyo in 2024. Miki denied knowingly assisting Russian intelligence and said his company ships only permitted goods, primarily medical equipment and cosmetics. However, a shipping document he provided to the newspaper showed medical equipment sent to Russia via Sri Lanka in March, and an unsuccessful attempt to conceal the recipient’s name revealed it was Russian pharmaceutical company R-Pharm.

While R-Pharm itself is not under sanctions, its founder, Alexey Repik, has been sanctioned by the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia because of his close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin and his support for Russia’s war effort. Proco Air has not been accused of any wrongdoing, and Miki said Japanese authorities have never contacted him regarding the shipments.

According to estimates by the Ukrainian government cited in the investigation, about 90% of the Russian missiles and drones examined contained Japanese-made components. After a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile struck a residential building in Kyiv in May, killing at least 24 people, investigators found that its guidance system contained a Japanese computer module despite export restrictions.

Ukraine has repeatedly provided Japan with evidence that Japanese components are being used in Russian weapons. In April 2025 alone, at least eight diplomatic letters were sent to Japan’s Foreign Ministry containing photographs and lists of electronic circuits, transmitters, and microchips recovered from Russian missiles and military equipment. At least eight additional letters were sent later that year.

The documents identified components made by Panasonic, Toshiba, and NEC. However, investigators found no evidence that the companies knowingly supplied products to Russia. The companies denied violating export restrictions, while NEC said the components identified were older models that had not been sold by the company for years.

Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry said it has warned companies about attempts to circumvent sanctions and has blacklisted dozens of foreign firms. Western governments have also shared intelligence with Tokyo regarding Russian procurement networks and companies suspected of helping transfer prohibited technology.

Despite those efforts, Japanese authorities have taken no action against Pilchenkov. According to the investigation, Japan has long been regarded as a “paradise for spies” because of weak espionage laws and restrictions placed on its intelligence services after World War II. The report also notes that Japan does not have an independent foreign intelligence agency.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has begun expanding Japan’s intelligence capabilities and export controls. In January, Tokyo police exposed a Russian intelligence officer posing as a Ukrainian who allegedly attempted to steal trade secrets from a Japanese employee. Because Japan lacks a comprehensive espionage law, the Japanese employee was prosecuted under competition laws while the Russian operative had already left the country.

Pilchenkov declined repeated requests for comment from The New York Times. Reporters visited Aeroflot’s Tokyo office on three occasions, but each time were told he was either unavailable or unwilling to speak.

The investigation concludes that although Western countries expelled hundreds of Russian intelligence officers from Europe, Moscow did not abandon their operations. Instead, it relocated many of them to countries with weaker oversight and industries capable of supplying the technology needed to sustain Russia’s war effort.

(YWN World Headquarters – NYC)