Jewish Breaking NewsIsraeli Defense Official Warns Iran May Already Have Operational Chemical & Biological Warheads for Ballistic Missiles as IDF Keeps Home Front Directives Unchanged
A senior Israeli defense figure has told BNN that Iran may already possess operational chemical and biological warheads for its ballistic missiles, with the IDF confirming to BNN that there has been no change in Home Front Command (Pikud HaOref) civil-defense directives.
The assessment gained fresh attention after Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, founder of the Israel Defense and Security Forum (IDSF) and an adviser to the Israeli government on defense matters, said the threat is “not theoretical” and that there is “a good chance they already have it,” describing the capability as something Israel believes “may be operational.” In a separate interview with the Washington Free Beacon, Avivi said Israel’s defense establishment is actively discussing the possibility of chemical and biological warheads and is factoring those capabilities into target planning for any potential strike, warning that missile production is continuing “around the clock” and that newer systems are more sophisticated than those used in the June 2025 war.
That dovetails with reporting from Iran International, which cited informed military sources saying the IRGC is developing biological and chemical warheads for long-range ballistic missiles, alongside upgrades to command-and-control and moves involving launcher deployments, while also noting Tehran’s longstanding denials of pursuing “unconventional” weapons.
BNN pressed Avivi directly on the obvious public question: if the chemical/biological threat is real, why hasn’t Pikud HaOref distributed gas masks or issued new guidance? Avivi’s answer was blunt, Israel will prioritize offense and military defense layers, and he does not expect a gas-mask push “at this time.” He argued Israel’s air-defense architecture can handle the threat, even as he acknowledged the unique psychological impact of non-conventional warheads and the limits of standard sheltering if chemical agents are dispersed at scale.
Avivi also framed what he sees as Iran’s motive and timing. He said Tehran accelerated missile production after the June 2025 “12-Day War,” driven by a desire for revenge and to rebuild deterrence after what it views as a damaging blow. He outlined three potential paths to escalation: an Iranian preemptive missile strike (including possible “non-regular” warheads), an Israeli preemptive strike, or a U.S.-led operation—which he said he expects, claiming Washington has effectively decided to confront the regime decisively.
The civil-defense question is especially charged because Israel previously halted routine gas mask distribution to the general public years ago, shifting production mainly toward rescue services and ending broad civilian distribution programs.
Finally, the “unconventional warhead” fear sits inside a wider chemical-weapons context. Open-source research and U.S.-linked assessments have pointed to Iranian work on pharmaceutical-based agents affecting the central nervous system and to concerns about Chemical Weapons Convention compliance, while Iran simultaneously invokes its history as a chemical-weapons victim, including the 1987 Sardasht mustard gas attack that the OPCW notes killed over 100 people.