Are the Saudis realigning with Israel’s foes?

 
Photo: AP Images

S

audi Arabia is a large geopolitical puzzle piece in the center of the Middle East.

Its oil reserves, its usefulness as a staging ground for regional military action, and its role as a bulwark against Iran have kept it a valued American ally — even through bumps in the relationship, such as the 9/11 terrorists who originated there, and more recently the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

But with the ascent of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) to the leadership, the stage seemed set for a new era. MBS was eager to diversify his country’s economy and curry favor in Washington, and some saw an opportunity to nudge the kingdom toward greater moderation, possibly including normalization with the State of Israel.

Yet since MBS’s warm reception at the White House only a few months ago, Riyadh’s latest moves seem to be hinting at a drift back toward radicalism.

The Saudis have now shelved the possibility of joining the Abraham Accords and have aligned themselves instead with Turkey, Qatar, and Pakistan — nations whose relationships with the West are more complicated. The Saudis even came to blows in Yemen with the UAE, a US alley.

To try to read these shifting sands, Mishpacha spoke to Edmund Fitton-Brown, a former British diplomat who has served in Saudi Arabia and Yemen and is now a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

Cold Feet over Tehran

Mr. Fitton-Brown says that on the question of regime change in Iran, the House of Saud seems to be hedging its bets: “If there is a real change, that could either be a source of greater risk or perhaps greater opportunity for the Saudis.”

That would explain why, even with the regime in Tehran on the ropes, the Saudis seem reluctant to take advantage of its weakness. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is reported to have helped dissuade President Donald Trump from striking Iran amid protests.

Now, as the US gathers an armada around the Islamic Republic, MBS has publicized his promise to Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian that Saudi Arabia will not allow its airspace or territory to be used in an attack on Iran.

Mr. Fitton-Brown suggests the Saudis don’t fully trust the US to finish the job: “If the US loses interest in Iran, and Iran rebuilds its military capacities and revitalizes its wounded proxies, that very quickly becomes the same threat which worried the Saudis in the past.”

Saudis Don’t Like Israel

Just a few years ago, Saudi Arabia seemed to be moving toward joining the Abraham Accords, with MBS telling an American interviewer that “every day we get closer.”

One of Hamas’s aims in its October 7 attack was to drive a wedge between the Saudis and Israel — and it seems to have worked. The war in Gaza sank Israel’s image in the Arab world, and the Saudis halted normalization talks.

Now, increasingly harsh anti-Israel and anti-Semitic rhetoric emanates from official and quasi-official Saudi channels. The new era between Israel and the Saudis that many in the West hoped was around the corner now appears to have been wishful thinking.

The deepest problem is that normalization with Israel remains unpopular among Saudi subjects. A recent poll of Saudis conducted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy showed that 81% of respondents viewed normalization with Israel negatively.

The Saudis are also hesitant to follow the lead of the UAE and Bahrain, which they view as “little brothers.” Given the monarchy’s role as guardian of Islam’s holiest sites, the House of Saud has to tread more carefully. “They’re more pragmatic than ideological, but Saudis have always been very nervous about criticism that doesn’t fit their image as leaders of the Islamic world,” said Mr. Fitton-Brown.

Still in the Mix

Mr. Fitton-Brown says MBS still wants to please President Trump, who took a strong pro-Saudi line after the frostiness of the Biden administration; that might push him toward normalization with Israel. Another motivation is messaging to Hamas and other terror groups.

“They’re aware of the argument that they should not give Hamas a veto over normalization with Israel, which is exactly what Hamas did on October 7,” Mr. Fitton-Brown says. “They’re not particularly keen on encouraging that line of thinking.”

Backing Different Horses

The Saudis’ growing alignment with Turkey and Qatar, two nations with deep ties to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, is creating concern on a number of fronts. But Fitton-Brown cautions against making too much of it.

For example, the Saudis conducted an aerial attack on a UAE weapons shipment to an anti-Houthi faction in southern Yemen. Although the Saudis are sponsoring the fight against the Houthis, the UAE had thrown its support behind a different coalition.

“[The Saudis] woke up and said, ‘We can’t break up the government coalition and risk weakening the anti-Houthi front. We have a border with Yemen, the Emiratis don’t.’ ” Fitton-Brown says.

The Saudis took a similar tack in Sudan and Somalia, backing forces with recognized Islamist ties, while the UAE supported their rivals. But while these moves put Saudi Arabia on the same side as Qatari and Turkish interests, Mr. Fitton-Brown feels this was happenstance. The kingdom’s primary concerns in both conflicts were keeping oil shipping lanes open and slamming the door on refugees. Its preference for the Qatari and Turkish-backed factions, which were stronger, was pragmatic rather than ideological.

“The Muslim Brotherhood is still proscribed as a terrorist organization in Saudi Arabia, as it is in the UAE,” says Mr. Fitton-Brown. “Qatar is still one of the leading state sponsors of the Brotherhood, so I don’t buy that the Saudis have left an alignment with the UAE and Bahrain in favor of one with Qatar.”

A New Muslim NATO?

Mr. Fitton-Brown suspects that this same pragmatism was behind Riyadh’s overtures to Turkey and Pakistan on a mutual defense agreement. Although on the face of it, this seemed to convey that the Saudis had lost interest in pleasing the US, Fitton-Brown suggests this alliance was more technical. The Saudis aren’t ready to help Pakistan fight India, any more than Pakistan would offer them its nuclear umbrella to fend off Iran.

“There’s a history with Saudia Arabia that its big enough and independent minded enough to always insist on maintaining a full range of international relationships.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1098)

The post Shifting Sands first appeared on Mishpacha Magazine.