JERUSALEM (VINnews) — Israeli political pundit Amit Segal analyzed the current situation for Israel after the surprise two week ceasefire orchestrated by Pakistan between the US and Iran.

The lesson Israel learned from October 7 is that intentions don’t matter, only capabilities do. For years, the IDF ignored the growing terrorist threat on its borders and instead focused on whether the enemy intended to attack or whether it was in its interest to do so. Similarly, although it may be tempting to analyze the mood in Tehran, it is irrelevant. The only real question is whether Iran currently has the capability to pose a serious threat to Israel. After 40 days of war, the answer is: less than it did forty days ago.

In terms of results, Iran had promised it would not agree to a temporary ceasefire, yet it did. It declared that the Strait of Hormuz would not reopen, yet it is expected to reopen. It swore that any agreement would include ending the war in Lebanon, yet Hezbollah suffered hundreds of casualties today. What remains resembles a ceasefire arrangement between the US and Iran that could have allowed the ayatollahs to continue attacking Israel. This is what’s left of the Iranian axis that once cast fear across the Middle East.

The Iranian “victory narrative,” encouraged by large parts of the international media, argues that Iran survived ten rounds against a heavyweight champion. But the real question is: what is that survival worth?

Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah used the perceived draw with Israel in the 2006 Second Lebanon War to receive a blank check from his Iranian patrons and build a formidable “axis of resistance.” What will Iran do now with its sense — real or manufactured — of survival?

After Operation “Rising Lion,” every available Iranian rial was invested in rebuilding its ballistic missile array, seen as its only effective counter to Israel. The result was relatively rapid reconstruction, but also massive public anger, suppressed only through brutal repression and murder of insurgents. Now, there is much more to rebuild and far fewer resources: should Iran invest in a new navy? An air force? More missiles? Rebuild Hezbollah, which is suffering from a severe deficit? Or invest domestically to calm a population whose situation has only worsened?

The condition of what was once the Iranian empire is dire, with no clear signs of improvement ahead.

The Gulf states attacked by Iran have not forgotten the lesson. They are not like Israel, accustomed to periodic rounds of conflict. Generations of Emiratis, Qataris, and Saudis will carry the trauma of running to unprotected areas while tourism, stability, and energy infrastructure went up in flames. Israel stands to gain significantly from this anti-Iran coalition, which has been forcibly pushed off the fence and is unlikely to return anytime soon. It is to be hoped that Trump and Netanyahu will solidify a more stable and open alliance with these Gulf states for the benefit of future generations.

The (temporary?) end of the war also marks the beginning of Israel’s next election campaign. Netanyahu, who had hoped to ride the collapse of the Iranian regime to political survival, now faces a more complex reality than expected when launching the operation.

There is a sense of disappointment among the public over the gap between hopes for regime change and the current outcome. The bigger challenge lies in the northern front, where public sentiment remains bitter — and understandably so — after false promises that Hezbollah had been defeated. Opposition leaders have identified this well, competing to frame the situation as a historic and disgraceful failure, hoping voters will connect more with that narrative than with Netanyahu’s promises of total victory.

For the prime minister, the fall of the Iranian regime in the coming months has become a top priority — not only strategically, but also politically. Everyone hopes the Iranian regime will fall soon; Netanyahu would certainly prefer it happens before October 27 this year.