Israeli officials have stepped up efforts in recent weeks to advance the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a trade route linking India to Europe via the Gulf states, Jordan, and Israel—a route that would bypass the Strait of Hormuz, Ynet reported.

Such a corridor could significantly diminish Iran’s leverage over global trade. It could also help prevent scenarios in which international economic considerations restrict Israel or deter it from taking military action against Iran when necessary.

Israel’s role in the initiative—unveiled by the Biden administration just weeks before the October 7 attack—became more complicated once the war in Gaza began.

Israeli officials in the Foreign Ministry and the Finance Ministry view the current situation as a unique window of opportunity, and they are working to accelerate the project so as not to miss the historic opportunity created by ongoing regional discussions.

Sources familiar with the details told Ynet that one of the main challenges of the initiative is securing Saudi Arabia’s participation, as Riyadh is currently far less enthusiastic than other Gulf states.

While much of the public focus remains on the Hormuz dilemma, Israeli officials are intensifying contacts to establish an alternative corridor. Sources with ties in the Gulf confirmed that serious efforts are underway to find a workable solution and move the project forward in the wake of the war with Iran.

The IMEC is a multi-layered trade route that combines maritime shipping, rail transport, ports, and infrastructure into one connected system. In practical terms, it is designed to function as a coordinated logistics chain that moves goods between India and Europe more efficiently by linking together existing and newly built transport segments across several countries.

Goods would first leave India, for example, from ports such as Mumbai, and be transported by cargo ships to ports in the Gulf, such as in the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia. Instead of continuing by sea through the traditional route around the Arabian Peninsula and into the Red Sea toward the Suez Canal, the cargo would be unloaded at Gulf ports and transferred onto freight trains. These trains would then carry the goods overland across Saudi Arabia and Jordan, eventually reaching Israel. From there, the cargo would once again be loaded onto ships and transported across the Mediterranean to European ports such as Greece or Italy.

The most significant new component of this system is the creation of a continuous and efficient rail network across the Arabian Peninsula. While some rail infrastructure already exists in parts of the Gulf, it is currently fragmented and not fully connected across borders. The corridor would require the construction of new rail lines in key areas, particularly in Saudi Arabia and possibly Jordan, as well as the upgrading of existing lines to handle large-scale freight transport.

In addition to rail, several other elements would need to be developed or expanded. Ports in India, the Gulf, and Israel would require upgrades to increase their capacity and improve the speed at which cargo is loaded and unloaded. Logistics hubs would be established along the route to facilitate the transfer of goods between ships and trains, as well as to provide storage and customs processing. Digital infrastructure would also play an important role, allowing for real-time tracking of cargo and faster customs clearance across multiple countries. There are also plans tied to the corridor that go beyond traditional trade, including the potential development of energy connections such as electricity cables and hydrogen pipelines, as well as data infrastructure like fiber optic networks.

One of the main reasons countries are interested in this corridor is the potential for increased speed and efficiency. By combining sea and land transport in a coordinated way, it could reduce transit times compared to existing routes through the Suez Canal. It also offers a strategic advantage by providing an alternative to vulnerable maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, where tensions or conflict could disrupt global shipping. In broader geopolitical terms, the corridor is also seen as a way to counterbalance China’s Belt and Road Initiative by offering a different model of regional and intercontinental connectivity.

In essence, the corridor would operate through a combination of sea transport from India to the Gulf, rail transport across the Middle East into Israel, and then sea transport again from Israel to Europe. Rather than being a single piece of infrastructure, it is better understood as a network that connects different transport systems into one integrated route, with the goal of creating a faster, more resilient alternative for global trade.

At the same time, the project faces substantial obstacles. Saudi Arabia is an essential link in the corridor, and without its full cooperation, the route cannot function. For now, Riyadh’s enthusiasm is more restrained than that of several other Gulf states. Regional political dynamics add further complexity, especially given the sensitivities surrounding Israel’s ties with Arab countries and the influence of ongoing conflicts. The initiative also demands extensive intergovernmental coordination and major financial investment, making implementation both complicated and potentially slow.

(YWN Israel Desk—Jerusalem)