New York (VINNEWS/Rabbi Yair Hoffman) THE QUESTION: A career scammer, who has taken the life-savings of several people is sitting in prison. He declares with perfect calm that Hashem will surely engineer his acquittal. Deep down he looks at his incarceration as a mere setback and he has not done Teshuvah. Is this bitachon? Should he, in fact, even have bitachon? In short, may a rasha have bitachon?
And if the answer is “no” – then who is bitachon for? Don’t all of us do something wrong?
THE ANSWER: This is a preliminary answer and it could be subject to several revisions. There are, of course, numerous sources and different girsaos (versions) of the sources. As far as end-conclusions – there seems to be six possible views on the topic. They are quite far-ranging and we may be tempted to vehemently disagree with at least one of them.
- Yes, a rasha should have bitachon – and it will be effective but he must first do Teshuvah.
- Yes, a rasha should have bitachon – and it will be effective but he must change for the future, but not necessarily do Teshuvah.
- Yes, a rasha should have bitachon – even if he does not do Teshuvah nor even change in the future.
- No, a rasha should not have bitachon.
- No, a rasha should not have bitachon and it is an aveira – for him to have it!
- The way it works is that bitachon is a power in and of itself – and it can even work for a bank-robber to rob successfully.
The pasuk in Tehillim (32:10) states, “Many are the pains of the wicked, but as for him who trusts in the Hashem- kindness will encompass him.” The Medrash on Aicha Rabba 4:23 cites the pasuk in Tehillim and states that “even a Rasha – Hashem accepts him.” The Matnas Kehunah – the commentary of Rav Yissachar Ber HaKohen of Szczebrzeszyn, Poland (d. after 1608), a talmid of the Rema, completed in 1584 and printed in Cracow in 1587-88 – explains that when the Midrash refers to a rasha, it adds the words “vechazar bo” – as a caveat. The rasha being “accepted” is not the rasha of the first half of the pasuk; he is a rasha who has already turned back. On this reading the second clause of the pasuk is not describing the wicked man at all, but the former-wicked man, and the chessed is the reward for his return. This would seem to indicate position #1 – bitachon works for a rasha, but only after Teshuvah unlocks it.
The Yefei Toar – the commentary of Rav Shmuel Yafeh Ashkenazi of Constantinople (c. 1525–1595), first printed in Venice in 1597 – on Aicha Rabbah 4:23 does not add the words “vechazar bo” but states that he took it upon himself not to go that way in the future. The RaShaSh – Rav Shmuel Strashun of Vilna (1794–1872), whose glosses appear on nearly every daf of the Vilna Shas – on Vayikrah Rabba 15:4 understands it this way as well. The line of reasoning that separates this from the Matnas Kehunah is subtle but real. The Matnas Kehunah requires a completed act of return, a “vechazar bo” that addresses the past. The Yefei Toar asks for something forward-looking instead: a kabbalah, a firm resolve regarding the future, without insisting that the slate of the past has yet been wiped clean. A man may be unable to undo what he has done, and may not yet have reached full charatah on it, yet still resolve with sincerity that he will not continue down this road. That resolve, on this reading, is enough to make his bitachon valid. This forward-facing condition – change without full Teshuvah – is precisely position #2. [Note: the original draft labeled this source as position #4; on the description given, it maps more naturally to #2, and is placed there here.]
On the other hand, the simple reading of the pasuk is that the beginning seems to inform the context of the last part of the pasuk – that the pasuk refers to a Rasha who has neither done teshuvah nor changed his plans for the future – and his act of bitachon will cause Hashem to act in the manner of Chessed with him. The strength of this reading is that it takes the pasuk exactly as written: it is the boteach, the one who trusts, who is surrounded by chessed, and the pasuk attaches no further qualification to him. To insert a “vechazar bo” or a kabbalah for the future is to add words the pasuk itself does not supply. On the plain meaning, the very act of trusting is what draws down the chessed, and it does so on its own terms. This seems to be the approach of the Yalkut Tehillim #719. The Midrash Tehillim #25 relates a moshol of a thief who got caught and claimed he was a relative of the king. When the king asked him, “You are my relative??” He answered, “I trusted you would save me.” The king said, “Since you had faith in me, I will save you.” The moshol is striking precisely because the thief is still a thief – he offers no repentance and promises no reform – and yet the act of casting himself upon the king is itself what earns him rescue. The trust, not the worthiness of the one who trusts, is the operative cause. These would be possible sources for position #3.
The Chovas HaLevavos Shaar HaBitachon Chapter III, in the fourth requirement for Bitachon, specifically writes that it is ineffective for someone who rebels against Hashem. The reasoning here flows from the Chovas HaLevavos’s entire framework of what bitachon is. For Rabbeinu Bachya, bitachon is not a standalone technique that produces results; it is the natural fruit of a relationship of loyalty between a person and his Creator. One reasonably relies on another only where there is a basis for that reliance – and the rebel has severed the very basis. A man who is actively defying the One in whom he claims to trust has placed himself outside the relationship that bitachon presupposes. His “trust” is therefore hollow at the root; there is nothing for it to rest upon. This is in line with position #4 – not that Hashem refuses him out of anger, but that the rasha’s bitachon simply lacks the foundation that would make it bitachon at all.
The Chsam Sofer writes in his Drashos Vol. II page 236 that not only is there no Bitachon for a rasha – but it is even a sin for him to do so. The reasoning moves one step beyond the Chovas HaLevavos. For the Chovas HaLevavos the rasha’s bitachon is merely empty; for the Chsam Sofer it is affirmatively harmful, and the harm is spiritual. A rasha who tells himself that Hashem will rescue him has handed himself the perfect excuse never to change. His “bitachon” becomes a cushion for his wickedness – a way of converting the comfort of faith into a license to keep sinning. Far from drawing him closer, it anesthetizes him against the very discomfort that might have prompted Teshuvah. Because it actively entrenches him in his sin, the act is not neutral but itself an aveira. This would fit with position #5.
Finally, this author had heard in the name of Roshei Yeshiva in the Telze Yeshiva that Bitachon acts as a power in and of itself. The reasoning runs parallel to the way Rav Chaim Shmuelevitz explains the power of Mida Kneged Mida in the case of Penina and Chana. Penina did nothing wrong – she acted 100 percent leshaim shamayim, prodding Chana only so that Chana would daven with greater intensity. She was nonetheless punished, because she was in fact the source of pain to Chana. The lesson Rav Chaim draws is that certain spiritual realities operate mechanically, by their own internal logic, independent of the intentions or the merit of the person who sets them in motion. Pain caused produces consequence, regardless of motive.
On this model bitachon is the same kind of force: a real spiritual power that, once activated, exerts its effect on its own, without first weighing the righteousness of the one who wields it. Just as Penina’s pure intentions did not exempt her from the mechanism, the rasha’s wickedness would not exempt him from this one. Carried to its logical end, this means the koach of bitachon could in principle “work” even for a bank-robber bent on a successful heist. This would fit with position #6, although most people vehemently disagree with it.
The author is indepted to Sefer Sha’ar Elchonon for much of the source material. The author can be reached at [email protected]